INTRODUCTION

1
This chapter examines a critical aspect in the sociological analysis of social and political movements: the role that activists play in the initial organizational development and consolidation of those movements. Specifically, it looks at the impact and characteristics of movement entrepreneurs in the National Socialist Party in Germany (NSDAP) between its reestablishment in 1925 and its first major electoral breakthrough in September 1930. The results point up the crucial importance of these movement entrepreneurs during the party's early development as an organization. The analysis shows that activists embedded in the organizational networks of the right wing nationalist milieu were also those most likely to establish local party organizations. In the aggregate, their activities created the wider organizational infrastructure that the movement needed for its rapid expansion of membership after 1930.
As we shall see, the early Nazi activists were not isolated individuals; rather, they were typically part of an extended organizational network of the nationalist-militarist right wing of German politics and society. This fragmented and highly politicized 'movement industry' was largely a product of the crisis-fraught postwar years when militias of disbanded and regrouped army units (Freikorps) challenged the legitimacy of the new political order. By the early 1920s, however, the Freikorps and related associations had grown more isolated from the emerging democratic political system. Nonetheless, they continued to influence the national-militarist right wing of Germany's political spectrum and formed what Linz (1978) identified as the 'disloyal opposition' that plagued the Weimar Republic throughout its troubled existence.
While the Nazi movement may have been more marginal to mainstream national politics during the mid to late 1920s than at any other time during the Weimar Republic, the activists 2 of the Nazi movement at local levels certainly were not. Throughout the period, Nazi activists continued to establish local party chapters and build networks between Party organizations and mainstream civil society. As we shall see, for these movement entrepreneurs the key to mobilization was the combination of three factors: their strong embeddedness in the networks of the Republic's disloyal opposition; a blanket rejection of the political mainstream (the 'System' in Nazi terminology); and their 'normal', basically middle-class, profile (at least in a statistical sense).
Unlikely Success?
Judging from its rapid ascent to power, National Socialism was one of the most 'successful' social and political movements of the 20th century. Initially fuelled by the political instability and social upheavals of the early post waryears, Nazi activists failed miserably in their first attempt to gain political power, the so-called 'Munich Beer Hall' uprising in November 1923. The Party was consequently declared illegal, and with Hitler imprisoned, the Nazi movement was left in some disarray. Many movement activists, however, went underground to establish clandestine organizations and local 'cells' or joined other right-wing groups, only to regroup soon after the NSDAP was re-founded in February 1925 upon Hitler's release.
At first, the re-established NSDAP, like the old one, represented a fringe element of Weimar politics. Ill-financed, marked by internal divisions and seemingly out of touch with the country's consolidating, though fragile, political culture, the NSDAP had nonetheless managed to position itself as the central institution of right-wing nationalism by the late 1920s. By September 1930, the NSDAP had grown into one of Germany's key political forces, gaining 18.3% of all votes cast in the national elections, and in the following three years it managed to occupy and control all essential centres of political power. Thus, in just eight years, a movement located at the Germany's political and geographical fringes came to rule the country and encountered little resistance against the establishment of a one-party dictatorship.
How was the phenomenal success of National Socialism possible? This is one of the most crucial questions in the study of Nazism, one that continues to occupy social scientists and historians alike. 2 Yet this chapter will approach this question neither primarily against the historical background in which the movement developed (see Lacquer, 1996; Sternwell, 2 Research on the development of National Socialism has moved away from universal and monocausal explanations. Following the seminal work by Linz (1976 Linz ( , 1978 , research increasingly emphasizes the complex and conditional causal structure behind the success of National Socialism. As Falter suggests (1991: 364-74) , none of the main explanations proposed can account on its own for the breakthrough of national socialism: neither the class-based attempt by Lipset (1960) , which argues that the initial success of the NSDAP was due to the electoral support provided by a disenchanted, impoverished middle class, nor Bendix's (1952) idea of the radicalization of "apolitical" population segments which sees the decisive success factor in the mobilization of non-voters and the young, nor Burnham's (1972) theory of political-religious nationalism, in which the middle-class Protestant block carried the deciding vote for the NSDAP. 3 1994) nor from the perspective of political science (Lespius, 1978; Kater, 1983; ) , nor as a micro-sociology of Nazism (Falter, 1991; Kater, 1985; Mühlberger, 1995; Brustein, 1996) . Rather, the chapter's primary concern is to examine the initial expansion and institutionalization of National Socialism as a network of local party chapters, organizations, and related associations.
We approach the organizational development of the party from the perspective of local party activists: the social movement entrepreneurs. The overall hypothesis is that these activists created and combined an important part of the organizational infrastructure upon which the NSDAP at first gradually, and later ever more forcefully, expanded into more and more areas of the country's social and political life. They did so by linking the organizational core of the Nazi movement, once established, to culturally and socially diverse networks of constituencies, often transcending narrow ideological, religious and economic boundaries. By the late 1920s, the movement had managed to gain broad support that increasingly cut across the class structure and the political spectrum of Weimar Germany.
MOVEMENT DEVELOPMENT
By 1930, the NSDAP had became a "Volkspartei," or people's party (Falter, 1991; Brustein, 1996) that would feed on complex voter structures and shifts among the electorate. Linz (1976; suggests that the underlying reasons for the success of national socialism lay neither in the divisive Weimar party system nor in volatile voter behaviour alone; they also resided in the "pre-political field" of local milieus, associations, networks and movements. Indeed, three patterns in the development of the Nazi movement underscore the importance of the pre-political field: its development as a membership organization rather than as a political party based on votes; the re-formation of an organized disloyal opposition during the 1925 presidential elections; and the amplifying impact of strongholds earlier for later successes at the ballot box.
First, from a social movement perspective, it is important to bear in mind that the electoral success of the NSDAP came after its organizational development. By 1928, the Party had created a highly differentiated and comprehensive organization:a structure perhaps rather too complex and too large for the size of its membership or the votes gained in elections. Next to the party apparatus itself, and the parallel structures of the SA and the SS, numerous other organizations existed. This structure emphasized individual participation in numerous local events, meetings, and quasi-military drills [parades/rallies?]. The NSDAP as an organization was thus able to link the level of national and regional party politics to the everyday lives of party members and thereby managed to create a sense of community or "Gemeinschaft."
Thus, for the first five years, the re-established NSDAP was primarily a membership organization that emphasized active member participation rather than voter maximization. With about 100,000 party members in some 1,400 chapters and numerous party 4 organizations, the party achieved just 2.6% or 1 million of the valid votes cast in the national elections of May 1928. The relationship between membership numbers and voter numbers changed dramatically with the September 1930 vote: while membership increased by about one third to 129,000, the Party obtained a surprising 7.9 million (18.3%) of the valid votes cast-an eight-fold increase on 1928. Consequently, the NSDAP, now the second largest party, suddenly changed from being a membership organization into a People's Party able to attract votes from population segments outside the narrower reservoir of ethnic and nationalist voters.
Second, irrespective of the explosive growth of Nazism after 1930, the NSDAP was able to build significantly wherever right-wing nationalist constituencies had been either established or reinforced in the middle and late 1920s. The 1925 presidential election (the so-called "Hindenburg election", thus named after the conservative candidate who won the election and later, in 1933, entrusted the chancellorship to Hitler) offers the clearest example of this phenomenon. This election brought with it the first successful gathering of the nationalist and anti-republican groups hostile to any form of democratic government. Falter (1991: 360-63) has found a very close correlation (r=0.82) between the election results in 1925 and the results of the national elections between 1930 and 1933. In fact, two-thirds (67.2%) of the variance in the NSDAP votes in the national elections between 1930 and 1933 are explained by the results for the Hindenburg election. In electoral districts where Hindenburg, the conservative candidate, had achieved above average proportions of votes cast, whether in Catholic and Protestant areas, whether in urban or rural, working-class or middle-class ones, the NSDAP was later significantly more successful than it was in the "Hindenburg Diaspora" (Falter 1991: 360) . Thus, the NSDAP made the most gains in areas that had early on experienced a broad-based formation of nationalist groups. The early organization of the "disloyal opposition" proved vital for the Party's later successes.
Finally, a third pattern shows that Nazi strongholds, i.e. constituencies in which the NSDAP received above average support [?] in elections prior to 1930, are the best predictors of electoral success in the national elections of the early 1930s (Falter, 1991: 355, 439) . In the September election of 1930, the variable "Nazi stronghold" alone accounts for 38% of the explained variance in the NSDAP portion of the votes cast, and for 28% of the explained variance in votes gained. In other words, during the critical breakthrough phase of the NSDAP, the party grew stronger in local areas where it had already established itself as a serious political factor.
Resource Mobilization
The close connection between embeddedness in local milieus and early organizational development appears to have been critical for later movement success. On what basis did this connection develop [??]? For McAdam et al (1988) , Neidhardt and Rucht (1993) , Della Porta and Diani (1999) and other theorists in the field, social movements are highly contingent phenomena. Their success not only requires the right cognitive-cultural framing structures to make movement concerns understandable and attractive to potential 5 constituencies, 4 they also need sufficient grounding in local milieus, in particular existing organizations and networks, if they are to mobilize resources. 5 The "active ingredient" in the Nazi movement, as in others, was the role of movement entrepreneurs, and the way in which they brought different organizations and their respective constituencies into the movement and also formed new ones.
Pre-existing social structures facilitate the development of social movements because these are able to emerge along given institutional and organizational paths (Neidhardt and Rucht, 1993; Cattacin and Passy, 1993) . These advantages spring from lower information and transaction costs for resources, and from the use of existing trust relations which facilitate member recruitment and retention. As regards National Socialism, the key social structure for its growth was the nationalist camp of right-wing politics, a complex and conflict-ridden organizational field. This arena constituted a veritable movement industry, and included a very broad spectrum of groups, ranging from small political parties and patriotic clubs, interest groups and youth groups to soldiers of fortune and paramilitary factions.
Converting and recruiting local leaders, and infiltrating their organizations, were the key to mobilizing the larger reservoirs of potential members. 6 On examining the population of a rural district in Bavaria, Zofka (1986: 60) showed that the Nazi movement was able to win over local villages by directly recruiting and mobilizing local opinion leaders. Koshar (1987) obtained similar findings for the city of Marburg, Hesse, between 1923 and 1933 , where NSDAP members held offices and prominent positions in local and regional associations through which the party directly and indirectly gained access to other social, political and economic spheres.
The cognitive-cultural framing and structural mediation of social movements, however, is only one of the preconditions for success. Of central importance is the presence of activists or movement entrepreneurs (McAdam et al, 1988: 716; Schmitt-Beck, 1990; Thornton, 1999) . These are the "active component" that facilitates framing and structural mediation. Like economic entrepreneurs, social movement entrepreneurs combine and coordinate "inputs" for some gain. In contrast to economic entrepreneurs, their prime motivation is not to maximize monetary profits; rather, their aim is to maximize the number of members, and the movement's influence and success (see Anheier, 2001 on the Nazi case). To this end, political entrepreneurs mobilize resources, connect groups, forge alliances, and seek to capitalize on political opportunities within and outside the movement (Gerhards and Rucht, 1992) . In fact, National Socialism initially offered a broad and open field for activists and volunteers that both invited and required participation. Besides the actual party organization, 4 See for the Munich NSDAP and the Nazi press; and Goffman, 1974, and Snow et al, 1986 more generally on the importance of framing. 5 See Anheier and Ohlemacher, 1996, and Anheier and for the Nazi movement; Diani, 1995, and Della Porta and Diani, 1999, more generally. 6 Hitler's strategy to refuse formal cooperation with any of the right-wing national associations opened the way for the infiltration and undermining of these organizations and clubs that rapidly gave the NSDAP a central organizational and political position of in the extreme right camps (see Grill, 1983 ). 6 such opportunities were especially available in SA and SS formations, as well as in the various special party organizations: the National Socialist Student's Association, the NS Welfare Association, the NS Women's Association, the German Cultural Association, the various professional NS-related associations for teachers, motorists, etc, and in numerous other interest groups and branches.
The rest of this chapter will take a closer look at how movement entrepreneurs contributed to the organizational development of National Socialism. Specifically, it will explore the spread of the Nazi Party in organizational terms through the network of organizational relationships that provided the material as well as the arena for movement entrepreneurs to operate.
THE SOCIOLOGY OF SINGLE MEMBERS
The empirical point of departure is the member registry for the city of Munich 7 maintained by the NSDAP Party Secretary at headquarters from 1925 to 1930. Together with nearly 5,000 Munich-based members , the Registry includes a separate category of so-called "single members," i.e., NSDAP members who resided in localities with neither a party chapter (Ortsgruppe) nor a district organization (Gau) . In other words, single members lived in areas outside the organizational-geographic reach of the Nazi Party.
Between 1925 and 1930, these single members were administered directly from Party Headquarters in Munich. Once local chapters or district party organizations had been founded, or once single members had moved to areas with party organizations in place, they were transferred to their relevant units. Did the 652 single members listed in the Munich Registry include a pool of movement entrepreneurs instrumental in mediating Nazi concerns in local milieus? And who connected the movement to other organizations? Who were the single members? What is their profile in terms of social background and organizational embeddedness? How many were involved in the founding of local party chapters? 7 The Berlin Document Center, where the Registry is located, houses extensive personnel records and related documents confiscated by US troops in 1945. Among these records is a nearly complete set of NSDAP membership cards , the membership records of the SA, the SS, and the Race and Settlement Main Office records, the National Culture Chamber, the NS Federation of Teachers, correspondence from major party organizations, and the records of the Supreme Party Court (see Browder, 1972; Kater, 1977) . The Munich Registry, arranged by city district and consisting of 22 bound ledgers, includes handwritten entries stating name, address, age, occupation, dates of joining and leaving the party, information on dues paid, and a separate set of comments (see . Using membership number and date of birth as key identifiers, the various holdings of the BDC were searched for information on individual members and then collated into individual dossiers, yielding a systematic data set on their social and political profiles. The single member registry includes 652 entries, with 12 names listed twice.
8 Table 1 shows monthly changes in the number of single members from the beginning of 1925 to the end of 1930 (see also Figure 1 ). The table highlights that the number of single members increased substantially after the re-establishment of the party in February 1925. In 1927, the number of single members reached around 400-the highest number-and dropped to almost 200 in the following years (Figure 1 ). In 1930, the remaining single members were transferred either to regional party organizations (Gaue), local units, or the foreign office of the NSDAP.
In the first half of 1925, 151 single members joined the party, and another 186 followed until the start of 1926 (Table 1) ; 9 their numbers fell off thereafter. Altogether, over half (58.4%) of all new entries had occurred by the first half of 1926: that is, within fewer than 16 months after the re-establishment of the Party in February 1925. This means that in purely quantitative terms single members as a membership category were most important during the initial re-organization phase of the NSDAP between 1925 and 1927. Simultaneously, other changes to the stock of single members became more important. The number of those leaving the party rose but fluctuated considerably, typically reflecting the political performance of the party. For example, in the aftermath of the lost 1928 National Election, 85 single members left the party, which was a decline of 21% in a total membership of 394 at that time.
Entries and exits were not the only factors that affected membership numbers. Transfers to other chapters are of special interest for our purposes. Such transfers usually happened when a group of Nazi supporters established a local party chapter. Transfers to local chapters also took place when single members moved to towns where local party organizations already existed. For example, single members moving to Berlin, Nuremberg or Munich would be transferred to existing local chapters in those cities. On the whole, few such transfers occurred initially, but then the number rose until the middle of 1926: first to 56, then to 67, fluctuating thereafter (Table 1) . By the end of 1927 there were only 13 transfers, but by one year later there were 95. After 1928, the number of transfers fell sharply as party chapters became more numerous across the country, and as regional party organizations assumed more responsibility for recruiting? single members. 10 8 This deals with the single members who joined the party in a community without a chapter, then left, and subsequently rejoined the party as single members in another town. 9 In Table 1 , entries (652 cases) and re-entries (105 cases) are combined. Withdrawals (144 cases), re-exits (9 cases), and expulsions (181 cases) are handled in the same manner.
10 Table 1 also shows that the number of transfers from other party organizations was essentially a phenomenon of the second and third year after the initial re-establishment. These transfers took place in two phases: approximately 47% of all transfers occurred between July of 1925 and December 1926, and a further 41% in the 12 months from July 1927 until June 1928. Exits divide into distinct periods: one in the second half of 1926, when 21% of single members left the party, and the other in the first half of 1928 when there was a drop of 22%. During 1926, two thirds of the exits were due to party expulsions, probably in connection with the so-called "Fürstenabfindung", or the policy debate on treatment of aristocratic property which sparked heated internal disputes and cleavages? within the NSDAP. Generally, we find that the reduction in membership through exits was mostly due
Creating Local Party Chapters
According to? the source material available in the BDC holdings, 45 (6.9%) single members were instrumental in founding chapters. This percentage rises to 7.5% if those living outside Germany are excluded. It is highly likely that 137 further cases (21%) were closely linked with the establishment of local chapters, although no explicit statement to that effect is to be found in the files available . This is typically the case if the Registry includes a handwritten note stating, for example, "transferred to hometown chapter on December 1, 1926," and if it is clear from information in the files that a particular single member played a central role in the creation of the new local party chapter.
11 While about a quarter (27.9%) of the single members can be either explicitly or implicitly connected with the establishment of local chapters, there is no indication of such activities in the sources available at the BDC for 351 (or 53%) of them. The BDC files contain no other information in this respect for another 118 members (16.1%).
The single members made up a very small proportion of overall party membership. At the end of 1925, the NSDAP had 27,117 members; a number that grew to 49,523 in 1926 and to 72,590 in 1927, and again increased in 1928 to 108,717 . By the time of the September election of 1930 the party had around 130,000 members (Schäfer, 1957: 11) . At no time between 1925 and 1930 did single members represent more than 1% of total membership. In 1925, when the number of single members reached its peak, their share of the total NSDAP membership amounted to 1%. It dropped to 0.7% in 1926, to 0.5% in 1927, and had fallen to below 0.2% by 1930 (Table 2) .
Nonetheless, the relatively small number of single members made a comparatively large contribution to the organizational development of National Socialism. According to the Partei-Statistik (Party Statistics) (NSDAP, 1935: 175) , 607 local chapters existed in Germany by the end of 1925. By 1928 the number had risen to 1,378, and by 1930 to 4,964 chapters.
12 Table 2 shows that, according to the Party Statistics, at least 771 chapters were founded in the period between the end of 1925 and the end of 1928. This period coincides with the phase when single members were most frequently transferred to newly established chapters (see Table 1 ). In fact, about 95% of all transfers to local chapters took place in those years. 13 to exclusion and "purges" within the NSDAP, and resulted less from voluntary withdrawals by individual members, which indicates a relatively high level of commitment among single members to the party's cause and mission. 14 Relative to the 1,378 chapters that existed in 1928, the share of single member creations still amounts to 13.2%. In other words, although single members represented less than 1% of total membership? after 1925, they contributed significantly to the party's establishment . After 1928, the importance of the single members for the organizational development of the party sharply declined-a process that mirrored the growing role of the regional party structures. As the party became more an"organization" and less a "movement," its continued expansion may have had less need for this particular type of local activist. The results in Table 2 support the contention by McAdam et al. (1988) that political entrepreneurs play a central role in the initial building phase of movements, and then lose their critical importance in the course of institutionalization (see also Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 151-152) .
Spatial Distribution of Single Members
The Nazi movement belonged to a period when mobilization efforts had to rely on direct contacts (speeches, meetings, rallies), postal communication, and travel by public transport, in particular trains and trams. Map 1 shows the relative concentration of single members in Bavaria, especially around Munich, for the period 1925-26. 15 This pattern corresponds to the prevailing centrality of the Munich NSDAP in southern Bavarian and Swabian communities until the late 1920s, and it explains the almost radial pattern of single member locations in this part of the country during 1925-26. Otherwise, Map 1 shows concentrations in the spatial distribution of single members in Franconia north of Nuremberg, where the NSDAP already had taken hold and had been present in the form of clandestine organizations during its prohibition between 1923 and 1925 (Pridham, 1973 . There are lighter concentrations in central Germany (Halle-Merseburg, Saxony), the Swabian Alps, and in parts of West Prussia.
Single members are relatively less frequent in those parts of the country in which regional party organizations were already in place by 1925. This is most markedly the case of Baden, an area in Southwest Germany adjoining the French border, where the Party achieved early successes in establishing local and regional organizations (Grill, 1983) . In such cases, the regional party organization (Gau), rather than Munich Headquarters, would administer any single members residing in the area. Hence, we may expect the spatial concentration of single members in the vicinity of existing Nazi strongholds, as shown for Munich in Map 1, to be replicated in areas like Baden as well.
The relative concentration of single members in and around areas in which the Party was already established increased rather than decreased between 1925 and 1930. Table 3 shows the geographical distance from home towns to Munich for each of the respective cohorts.
16
Single members who joined in 1925 were located at a greater distance from Munich and were geographically more scattered than later cohorts: for the 1925 cohort, the average distance amounted to 262km; for the 1926 cohort the distance diminished to 156km, and to 126km one year later. Moreover, the spread of the distances decreased: while the standard deviation was 251km in 1925, and the inter-quartile range 344km, these distances shrink considerably for the next cohorts (see Table 3 ). In other words, in 1925, the average single member took at least half a day to get to Munich (250km there and back), while in the following years most single members could commute by train from their home town to Party Headquarters in Munich: in 1926 half of them already lived within 100km of that city, and 75% within a radius of around 200km from it.
Map 2 presents the approximate distribution of the various chapters established by the 1925 cohort of single members. It shows that they were founded predominantly in Bavaria, with a very wide scatter in the other areas. This pattern provides important insights, if we consider that in 1925 approximately 17% (104) of all the existing NSDAP chapters were founded in Bavaria (NSDAP, 1935: 175-76) . This means that single members located in closer vicinity to NSDAP strongholds probably managed more frequently to establish chapters than did those living at greater distances. This pattern is reflected in the historical development of the NSDAP, especially in Bavaria but also in Franconia. Vice-versa, the spatial distribution suggests that single members were less frequent and less successful in establishing chapters in regions where the NSDAP had an altogether lower presence at that time.
The single members were therefore neither isolated geographically nor cut off from the institutional world of National Socialism. The opposite seems to be the case, in fact: single members and existing NSDAP organizations were located in relative proximity to each other. In general, the geographical pattern of single member locations reflects the organizational development and consolidation of the party administration. Indeed, the Party's organizational growth via single member activities followed mainly an interstitial pattern whereby chapters were established in areas located between existing structures and networks; only at a second level did single member activities gain new, 'virgin' territory distant from established party strongholds.
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16 Distances are air distances based on geographical latitude and longitude. Members residing abroad were excluded from these calculations.
Broad-based, Middle Class Movement of the Lost Generation
Of the 652 single members, 70 (or 10.7%) were women, and 53 (or 8.1%) lived abroad. The youngest member was 16, the oldest 82. The average age of the single members at the time of admission was 32, and half were 28 or younger. Every second single member was aged between 23 and 38, and only 10% were older than 50. This means that the single members were primarily part of the "lost generation" born between 1890 and 1900 whose youth was characterized by nationalist fervour, the calamities of World War I, and the long years of economic and political instability after 1918.
How does the social profile of single members differ from that of the population in general? Table 4 shows that single members were represented in all branches of the economy; and in 16 of the 26 economic branches, the relative percentage of single members never differs by more than 2% points from the relative share for the entire population.
18 This means that the occupational profile of the single members in almost two thirds of the branches is approximately similar to that for the overall population. Table 4 also indicates the relative underrepresentation of the agricultural sectors among single members. Relatively few (8%) of all single members-compared to 22.4% for the entire population-worked in agriculture. The underrepresentation of this sector coincides with an overrepresentation of retailing: every fourth single member worked in this branch, compared to one in 12 for the entire population. The retail business was especially hard-hit by the prolonged economic depression? of the 1920s. In particular, small shopkeepers proved a fertile recruiting ground for both right wing and anti-Semitic movements generally (Falter, 1991; Mühlberger, 1995; Brustein, 1996) .
Three main results flow from comparison based on the 1925 census between the social class composition of the single members and NSDAP membership as a whole, as well as the entire population, (Table 5) . 19 First, single members were more likely to be economically active than the population at large (36% vs. 13%), but somewhat less so than the Nazi membership overall (13% vs. 5%). Second, single members, like the Nazi party generally, were primarily a middle class movement: two out ofevery three single members were of lower middle and middle class status, compared one in every two Nazi members, and 42% for the economically active population. Correspondingly, the share of lower class members was much smaller among single members than among both the party and the population. Third, the share of members of upper middle and upper class status was four times higher among single members than among the population, and twice the share of the overall Nazi membership.
Thus, the data suggest a social profile of the single members with four main characteristics: they were predominantly men of the 'lost generation,' from middle-class backgrounds, residing in cities or small towns rather than rural communities, and represented in all economic branches and occupations. In sum, their social profile, with the exception of the greater representation of upper middle and upper class members, was no different from what sociologists have identified for the Nazi membership as a whole (Kater, 1971 (Kater, , 1983 Fischer, 1995; Mühlberger, 1991 Mühlberger, , 1995 Brustein, 1996) .
Single Members and Organizational Memberships
What does the social profile mean for organizational development? Was it aided by the political and organizational embeddedness of single members? Clearly, given that they were of higher status than average members and the population at large, single members most likely had more economic and status-related resources available to them. Yet what were the "paths" and the social networks through which single members facilitated and effected the spread of National Socialism? 20 To answer this question, we must go beyond the standard membership profile and look at the organizational memberships of single members.
With the exception of a few cases, single-members were neither well-known nor prominent s. The case of the Dr. Emil Kirdorf is an exception . After a personal meeting with Hitler, the well-known 80-year-old industrialist joined the party as a single member in August 1927 and helped establish first contacts between Hitler and leading business circles in the Rhine-Ruhr area (Deuterlein, 1982: 285-26) . More typical are the cases of single members who devoted their work to the party, sometimes at great personal cost and often without receiving adequate financial or political rewards, let alone greater social mobility. In general, we find a broad spectrum of personal experiences among single members, ranging from the unspectacular to the tragic, and from the idealistic to the careerist,yet they all involve the use as well as the creation of organizations and networks in the development of the Nazi Party.
Living in the small town of Solln in Hesse, and born in Munich, Hermine G. is an example of the passive, unspectacular single member. As a war-widow she joined the party in November 1919 after a random encounter with Hitler, and she did so again on 4 April 1925 shortly after the re-establishment of the party. In the following years, she supported the establishment of the Solln Party chapter and founded local chapters for the NS women's association in Solln and surrounding towns.
The tragic-idealist case is exemplified by Egon L. from the Western town of Trier, who, after a brief military career (1889-96), worked as a merchant in the book trade. As company leader on the Western front in World War I, he was severely wounded and left disfigured, with some of his facial features destroyed. A tireless activist, he soon became a district leader of the Deutschvölkische Schutz-und Trutzbund (see below) and also joined the Nazi Party. In 1924, he was sentenced to six months imprisonment by the English military command in Cologne for his political activities, and was subsequently deported to Bavaria. After moving to Pasing near Munich, he a manager in a publishing house, yet soon became unemployed. He then worked as a freelance writer for the nationalist press but became increasingly impoverished. With the Party declared illegal, he ran the local chapter of the "Völkische Block" (People's Block) as well as various covert organizations like the "Trambahngesellschaft Pasing" (Trolley Society Pasing) or the "Siebener-Ausschuß" (Committee of Seven). All of these were soon merged into the Party after its re-establishment in 1925, and he founded the local Party chapter in Pasing. His party activities did not enable Egon L. to overcome his personal and financial difficulties: he later lived on public welfare payments and only after 1933 found part-time work in the National Propaganda section of the Party.
The case of Max K., a butcher from the small town upper Bavaria, exemplifies the careerist type of single-member. After being active in the Freikorps movements after World War I, he joined the party as a single-member in the Würzburg area in August 1926 and moved to Munich a year later, where he joined the local SS. He was involved in building the GernNeuhaus chapter on the city's outskirts, and managed to become a paid Party employee as a driver. After 1933, Max K. rapidly moved up the SS hierarchy and received high Nazi awards like the Totenkopfring or the Julleuchter. He died at the age of 67 in May 1944.
Alfred D., born in 1894 in Franconia, joined the air force as a volunteer in World War I, and returned in 1918 to join the Freikorps Oberland and the Einwohnerwehr, spending the next two years fighting in various uprisings in Bavaria, the Ruhr and Silesia. He joined the Nazi Party in 1923 and took part in the Beer Hall Putsch by organizing weapons and ammunition from dissolved Einwohnerwehr groups around Munich. With the Party declared illegal, he joined a clandestine organization, the Grossdeutsche Volksgemeinschaft, and founded local chapters in several places. After the re-establishment of the Nazi Party, Alfred D. re-joined it, together with some of his comrades from the Gruppe Oberland and the Grossdeutsche Volksgemeinschaft. In 1926, he moved to Auerbach in North-East Bavaria to establish a Nazi chapter and to practise as an architect, but he was soon driven away by political opponents who called for his business to be boycotted. In search of new opportunities, he resettled in the town of Lauf in Franconia, and in 1928 became one of the co-founders of the local Nazi chapter there, in addition to running the local SA chapter. His career was cut short in 1935 when, after being prosecuted for false testimony and homosexual conduct, he was sent to prison and expelled from the Party.
For about 75% of the single members, the available sources at the BDC indicate no membership of any organization other than the Nazi Party. 21 Twelve percent were members of one other organization, and 13% of two or more. The great majority (350) of the 397 organizational memberships held by single members were in related right-wing nationalist groups. Some of these memberships were in organizations of Germany's immediate political past, like the Freikorps and their successor organizations, others were in covert organizations founded while the Nazi party was illegal, and yet others were in general nationalist-militarist groups. The organizations not related to the right-wing nationalist camp included 21 The number of memberships held by single members was very probably higher both among the right-wing movement industry and within organizations of civil society, in particular local associations and ? religious organizations. The empirical information presented in this section is therefore based on an under-count of actual memberships. professional associations, students associations, sports clubs, art clubs, consumer associations, the German Alpine Society, the Red Cross, the German Medical Association, walking clubs, or the local volunteer fire brigade.
The primary locus of membership in the right-wing nationalist camp suggests that the movement may have 'fed' on pre-existing membership structures and clusters which the single members helped channel into the re-established Nazi party. Ties with other 'bourgeois' associations of Germany's civil society may well have enhanced this process by extending the reach of single members for recruitment purposes. Indeed, as Table 6 shows, the number of organizational memberships was closely related to the successful establishment of local party chapters. Whereas only 2% of single members for which no other organizational membership can be reported created party chapters, 12% of those with one membership, and 37% of those with four or more, did so. That the relationship is not linear suggests that other elements may have played a role as well, such as personal networks (Anheier and Ohlemacher, 1996) , socio-demographic factors (Anheier, 2001) , local party politics (Lepsius, 1978; and religious factors (Hamilton, 1982) .
Several right wing nationalist organizations were prominent among single members. These organizations display a complicated and often inter-related 'genealogy,' suggesting both cross-cutting membership clusters and continuity in the membership cadre. Most of these associations were initially founded between 1918 and 1923, with their roots in the Freikorps movement following Word War I, and many were declared illegal at one time or another. They ranged, however, from terrorist groups like the Organisation Consul to paramilitary groups like Bund Bayern und Reich, and from the anti-Semitic Thule Gesellschaft to politically motivated veterans associations like the Stahlhelm. Specifically:
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• Alldeutscher Verband (All-German Association; 1 membership among single members): founded in 1891 as a nationalist membership organization advocating procolonial and militarist policies, it represents in many ways the oldest and most influential part of the organized right wing in Germany until the early 1920s. The Verband encouraged the formation of Freikorps after World War I in order to oppose downsizing of the Army and the decommissioning of arms. It was instrumental in the founding of the Völkischer Schutz-und Trutzbund and other anti-semitic groups, and maintained links with terrorist organizations like Organisation Consul. By the mid 1920s, the Verband had lost its influence as other groups gained importance, in particular the NSDAP.
• Völkischer Schutz-und Trutzbund (National Protection and Defence Association; 13 memberships among single members): founded in 1919 as a parallel, allied organization to the Alldeutscher Verband, this was an anti-semitic, nationalist membership association fighting against the "Jewish Republic" and using the print media for massive propaganda campaigns. The organization was aided by leading right wing publishers, some of whom had close links with the Münchner Beobachter, the predecessor of what became the major Nazi newspaper a few years later . The Bund, with over 110,000 members in 1920, was declared illegal in 1922 and its members were largely absorbed by the NSDAP, together with the network of clandestine organizations that it had created between 1923-25.
• Völkischer Block (People's Block; 12 members) and Groß-deutsche Volksgemeinschaft (Greater German People Community; 13 members): these were membership associations serving as covert organizations while the NSDAP remained illegal. As such they became 'holding pools' for members from a variety of other nationalist fringe groups as well, in particular the successor organizations to the Freikorps movement like Bund Oberland and the Einwohnerwehr. Members of the Völkischer Block and the Groß-deutsche Volksgemeinschaft were rapidly reabsorbed by the NSDAP after 1925.
• Bund Oberland (11 members): the successor organization to the Freikorps Oberland, a militia group that fought in various uprisings in Munich (1919) , the Ruhr (1920) and Silesia (1921) . When the Freikorps Oberland was dissolved in the summer of 1921, the Bund Oberland was established in Munich, and included members from other Freikorps as well. Close co-operation with NSDAP (and SA) began, and a joint organization was formed in 1923: the Deutsche Kampfbund, which participated in the Beer Hall Putsch later that year. Declared illegal, the Bund reconstituted itself as a covert organization, the Deutscher Schützen-und Wanderverband (German Shooting and Walking Association). In May 1925, many members joined the Stahlhelm (see below), and merged with the NSDAP in 1926.
• Freikorp Epp (10 members) and Gruppe / Freikorps Ehrhard (1): two Freikorps founded in 1919 who exerted significant influence among the German military and in the nationalist political camp. Many of their members became instrumental in the founding and operating of successor organizations like the Einwohnerwehr (Epp group), Organisation Concul, Wikingbund, but also the early SA. Single members were part of several other Freikorps: Hinterpommern, Franken, Halle, Landshut, Baltikum, Bamberg, Anhalt, or Oberland.
• Einwohnerwehr (People's Defence; 10 members): units were created throughout Germany between 1919 and 1921 as local, anti-socialist militias to forestall political uprisings and protect the population against looting. With large weapons depots under their command, the Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria alone had about 300,000 members organised on military lines and with an organizational structure that was later adapted [adopted?] by the Nazi Party. The Einwohnerwehr units were dissolved in the summer of 1921, and the Bund Bayern und Reich became their main successor organization. However, many local units in Bavaria persisted and soon re-established themselves as SA chapters within the NSDAP in 1922-23 and, again, after 1925.
• Bund Bayern und Reich (Union Bavaria and Empire; 7 members): established in 1922 from a secret society, the Organisation Pittinger, which had assumed protection of the secret weapons depots of the Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria, by the end of 1923, the Bund had become the largest paramilitary, pro-Monarchist formation in Bavaria and included affiliated organizations like Reichskriegsflagge (Imperial War Flag; 3 members) and the Vaterländischen Vereine München. After 1923, both groups moved close to the NSDAP, and the remainder of the Bund began to co-operate closely with other monarchist organizations, merging with the Bavarian Stahlhelm section in 1929.
• Stahlhelm (Steel Helmet, 7 members): founded in 1918 as a veteran association for soldiers returning from World War I, this was a country-wide organization with close ties to the Freikorps and Einwohnerwehren. Anti-republican and anti-democratic, it pursued nationalist policies and began to exclude Jews from membership as early as 1924. By 1928, Stahlhelm had over 300,000 members and included a youth wing, a women's branch and a social welfare fund. Throughout the 1920s Stahlhelm was an umbrella organization for nationalist veterans associations ideologically close to the Nazi Party and the SA. After 1933, Stahlhelm became a de facto part of the SA, and fully merged with it in 1935.
The following three organizations were located on the extreme nationalist right. They seem to have figured less among single members in 1925-27, but they had constituted the secretiveelitist core of Nazism as an emerging movement industry since 1918:
• The Thule Gesellschaft was a lodge-like formation founded in 1918, and banned a year later, that served as the initial organizational core of the emerging Nazi movement. Its 1,500 members included many future Nazi leaders, and some of the rituals of the future Party were first introduced at the secretive meetings of the Thule Society.
• Organisation Consul was a clandestine organization that emerged in 1920 from the Freikorps Ehrhard. Its 5,000 members were administered under the cover of the "Bavarian Wood Processing Society" and engaged in terrorist activities, murdering several high-ranking politicians, including Finance Minister Erzberger in 1921 and Foreign Minister Rathenau in 1922. After 1923, it dissolved but its members joined the Bund Wiking and the Neudeutscher Bund.
• Bund Wiking (Viking Union; 1 member) was founded in 1923 by leading members of the Freikorps Ehrhard and the Organisation Consul as an extreme anti-republican, paramilitary unit. Its goal was the overthrow of the Weimar Republic and the establishment of a new political-nationalist system under its own leadership. Members worked closely with the NSDAP until the organization was declared illegal in 1926, when they joined the Party, SA and SS and other units such as Stahlhelm .
This complex movement industry provided the terrain on which the Nazi Party could develop, and on which movement entrepreneurs among the single members could operate. Unfortunately, data limitations and missing information do not allow complete reconstruction of the network that linked individuals and organizations. Nonetheless, for 99 of the single members with at least one membership, it has been possible to identify 83 named organizations in which they held memberships. The organization-member network so constructed among 99 members and 83 organizations includes 218 ties, and has a density of 3%.
This Boolean network was subjected to a hierarchical cluster analysis (HICLUS) 23 to detect structural patterns in memberships. Of course, given data limitations, the results can only be taken as illustrative of the larger network structure that may have existed among single members. Moreover, the network structures are not based on contemporaneous links but are a summary picture of associational affiliation among single members in the period under consideration.
Seven of the major right wing nationalist organizations emerge as the building blocks of the associational infrastructure created by the single members (Figure 2 ). They are typically linked through common genealogy and activities (not shown), but also through membership clusters of links among people as well as organizations. The seven organisations link a total of 61 single members directly or indirectly. For example, the Völkischer Schutz-und Trutzbund has nine members among the single members who belonged to this organisation alone. At the same time, there are an additional eight members who are linked both to this organisation as well as others : two links with the Völkischer Block, one with the Deutsche Volksgemeinschaft, three with the Bund Oberland, and two with the Einwohnerwehr. In addition, Völkischer Block and Deutsche Volksgemeinschaft are linked by one member, Deutsche Volksgemeinschaft and Einwohnerwehr by two, as are Einwohnerwehr and Völkischer Block.
The end result is a complex membership structure among members and organizations-the associational infrastructure of National Socialism. What single members did was to use and combine elements of this system into the emerging Nazi party. Where this system was in place, single members were more likely to succeed in establishing party chapters, where it was absent or less developed, they were less successful, as Table 5 suggested. It was embeddedness in pre-existing social networks that facilitated both their success in establishing local chapters, and in the aggregate, the organizational development of the Party.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the foregoing analysis of the single members of the NSDAP has been to furnish better understanding of the organizational development of National Socialism in the second half of the 1920s. Of course, it is not claimed that the activities of the single members represented the key to success of the NSDAP. Nonetheless, they contributed in important ways which are non-obvious and easily overlooked. The data indicate that a relatively small number of national socialists, i.e., those most tightly integrated in the ethnic-national areas, managed to establish a considerable proportion of the newly created chapters and consequently consolidated the institutional base and strength of Nazism at local levels.
The importance of the single member was most pronounced when the party was reestablished; and in a certain sense the single members as a membership category lost their relevance as the NSDAP emerged as an organization. The single members helped the party gain interstitial terrain between strongholds by gaining footholds in communities that hitherto had had no local party organization in place. The relative geographical proximity of the single member to existing party institutions highlights the central role played by organizational and personal networks in establishing the party. The organizational embeddedness of single members in the organizational infrastructure of Nazism aided their efforts to establish and anchor the party locally. The networks among nationalist, right wing organizations, and among members and Nazi sympathizers, provided the foundation on which the large and ambitious party organization was constructed. These early efforts helped make the Hindenburg effect and other path-dependent successes possible.
The results have two implications for the sociology of social movements. First, they underscore the importance of local activists and political entrepreneurs for the spread and development not only of participatory and democratic movements but also of authoritarian ones displaying a strong professional and hierarchical structure and a charismatic leadership. Second, the findings enable us to qualify traditional 'mass society' types of arguments about the marginality of activists of radical movements (Kornhauser, 1959; Lipset, 1960; Linz, 1967) . The local Nazi entrepreneurs did not arise from a social vacuum; rather, they originated mostly from already existing organizations and social networks. Single members who established chapters were part of complex associational infrastructures that included wide sections of the anti-republican and anti-democratic movement industry and only had sporadic ties to organizations operating in other sectors of society. It was not the social isolation of NSDAP members per se, but their embeddedness in an organizational field consisting of 'concentric' rather than 'cross-cutting' circles (Simmel, 1955) , and largely secluded from the rest of German civil society, that provided favourable opportunity structures for mobilizing protest into the institutional paths of the NSDAP. The success of social movements like National Socialism is therefore essentially determined by the way and the extent to which their core organizations (here, the NSDAP) succeed in building links to related causes, organizations and networks. 
